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Abstract
Using a representative sample of children all born to unwed parents drawn from the Fragile Fami-
lies and Child Wellbeing Study and a potential outcome approach to account for self-selection into
marriage, weinvestigatewhethermarriageafterchildbearinghasacausaleffectonearlychilddevel-
opment. Comparing children with similar background characteristics and parental mate-selection
patterns who differ only in terms of whether their parents marry after childbirth, we ﬁnd that mar-
riage after childbirth signiﬁcantly increases a child’s early cognitive performance but there is no
evidence that it affects child asthma risk or child behavioral outcomes.
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11 Introduction
While marriage remains the foundation of family life in the U.S., the traditional process of family for-
mation, speciﬁcally marriage before having children, has been dwindling. The proportion of American
children born to unmarried parents has increased dramatically over the past three decades, from 12%
in 1970 to nearly one-third of all births today (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002). The decoupling
of marriage and fertility behavior is particularly common among the low-income, less-educated urban
population (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994). Unmarried parents often have fewer resources, and their
children tend to display inferior outcomes compared to those raised by two married parents.1
Concernedwiththe risein out-of-wedlockparenthoodand itsimplications forthe childreninvolved,
recent policies have geared towards promoting marriage among unmarried parents.2 However, little
is known about the potential beneﬁts of marriage after childbirth. Couples who have children out-of-
wedlock are known to be selectively different from those who marry before having children. Unmarried
parents tend to be of lower socioeconomic standing, face poorer prospects in the marriage market, and
have lower incentives for assortative mating (Brown, 2004; Rosenzweig, 1999; Garﬁnkel et al., 2002).
Hence, interpreting the outcome differences found in simple comparisons of children born to married
vs. unmarried parents as beneﬁts of marriage can be misleading, as these differences may largely reﬂect
the more favorable characteristics of married parents.
This study examines whether marriage between the biological parents after childbearing beneﬁts
the children involved, using data on a representative sample of children all born to unmarried couples
drawn from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS). The FFCWS is particularly well
suited to address this question, as it provides child assessment data and detailed marriage, fertility, and
socioeconomic information on both biological parents for a large representative sample of children born
outside of marriage. We focus on the effect of marriage among parents who are romantically involved
at childbirth on child cognitive ability measured at age three, based on scores from the Peabody Picture
1See Ribar (2006) for a recent review of this literature.
2For example, President Bush’s Personal Responsibility and Welfare Reauthorization Act allocates a signiﬁcant budget
to programs promoting and stabilizing marriage.
2Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a widely-used interviewer-administered measure of receptive hearing and
verbal ability. In addition, effects of marriage on child health and behavioral outcomes are analyzed.
A signiﬁcant fraction of children in our sample experience the marriage of their parents. We analyze
whether marriage after childbearing affects early developmental outcomes using an empirical strategy
centering around a potential outcome framework similar to an experiment where the treatment (“mar-
riage after childbirth”) is randomly assigned. We draw on matching methods (e.g., Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1998) to identify the treatment effect, exploiting the detailed information
on the parents provided in the FFCWS. This approach addresses the selection into marriage by con-
structing an appropriate comparison group for children whose parents marry after childbirth. We ﬁrst
estimate the probability of marriage among unwed parents with a newborn, then compare the outcomes
of children whose parents share similar probabilities of marriage but differ only in whether their parents
transitioned into marriage within three years after their birth.
The present study also sheds light on the role of typically unobserved factors likely to be impor-
tant determinants of selection into marriage, including the father’s attributes and the degree to which
the parents have similar characteristics (“positive assortative matching”). While some studies have ex-
amined the determinants of (marital) union formation among the population of single mothers (e.g.,
Aassve, 2003), relatively little is know about the factors inﬂuencing the transition into marriage and
the role of similarities in traits between unmarried biological parents.This is partly due to the lack of
survey data on men who father children out-of-wedlock.3
Confronted with the “missing fathers problem,” studies typically account for selection into marriage
by controlling for the characteristics of the resident parent only (usually the mother) and implicitly as-
sume that unmarried couples are strongly (positively) assortatively matched as it is the case for married
parents. To the extent that the effect of parents’ marriage on child wellbeing reﬂects the characteristics
of both parents as well as the quality of the match, differences in the assortative mating patterns be-
tween unmarried parents and couples who marry before having children could lead to omitted variables
3Finding a representative sample of men who fathered children out-of-wedlock is extraordinarily difﬁcult in large U.S.
representative surveys: it has been estimated that more than half are missing (Garﬁnkel et al., 1998).
3bias in the estimated effect of marriage after childbearing. The present study addresses this concern and
investigates the role of parental match quality in marriage formation, utilizing the detailed information
on the biological parents and their relationship available in the FFCWS.
Much of the existing evidence on the effects of family structure and child outcome stems from
studies using data on school-age children and adolescents. Since unmarried families tend to be less
stable and short-lived (e.g., Bumpass and Lu, 2000), previous ﬁndings may be more characteristic of
children in relatively stable unmarried families. The present work seeks to identify the impact of marital
transitions within the ﬁrst three years after childbirth, thus drawing from the experiences and conditions
of a broader (potentially more representative) segment of the population of unmarried families. The
results suggest that parental marriage during the ﬁrst three years after childbirth signiﬁcantly increases
child cognitive ability: children whose parents marry after childbirth score about four points (1=4th of
a standard deviation) higher on the PPVT than if their parents had remained unmarried. However, we
ﬁnd no evidence that marriage reduces the child’s risk of developing asthma or behavioral problems.
2 Background
Beneﬁts of Marriage
There are several reasons to expect a link between marriage and child wellbeing, all are related to
either resource availability or allocation of resources. We will begin by considering mechanisms re-
lated to resource availability. First, marriage may involve the transition from a one to a two person
household, boosting the resource endowments (e.g., time and skill) of the family. Second, couples can
take advantage of economies of scale in household production (e.g., sharing the apartment). Third,
couples can realize gains from specialization and exchange in the presence of comparative advantages,
allowing them to produce more household public goods such as “child quality”. Fourth, the two-parent
household can pool individuals’ ﬁnancial resources and realize gains from exploiting risk-sharing op-
portunities (Becker, 1991). Fifth, individuals may become more productive as part of a family due to
4social learning (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). Finally, non-resident parents lack the ability to monitor
the use of their transfers to the family, potentially resulting in suboptimal investments made toward
their children (Willis, 1999).
Consistent with greater availability of material resources in marital unions, Brown (2002) ﬁnds that
children residing in mother-only or cohabiting-parents households are more likely to live in poverty
compared to children in married two-parent families. The differences in income may explain up to
half of the differences in child wellbeing (McLanahan, 1985). Single parents may also be unable to
perform the multiple roles and tasks required for childrearing. Hofferth (2001) estimates that among
children under age 13, those living with single mothers spent 12 to 14 fewer hours with their parents
per week compared to children living with married parents. The challenge of juggling multiple re-
sponsibilities can result in heightened stress levels and insufﬁcient childrearing practices among single
parents (Thomson et al., 1994). Conﬂicts over visitation may also encumber parenting effectiveness
(e.g., Brown, 2004).
The potential beneﬁts of marriage for resource availability discussed above are closely tied to the
two-person household (e.g., economies of scale) and hence may extend to cohabiting unions as well.
However, there are a number of institutional factors—including ﬁnancial beneﬁts and incentives to
invest in children provided by the marriage and tax code—that are exclusive to marital unions (e.g.,
Hamilton, 1999). For example, the legal bond of marriage ensures that there is compensation for
individuals’ sacriﬁces made on behalf of the family, thereby encouraging partners to take advantage
of specialization gains and pooling of ﬁnancial resources, and foster more deﬁned parental roles (e.g.,
Brown, 2004). Consistent with the incentives provided by these institutional differences, cohabitors
have been found to be less likely to pool their incomes (e.g., Winkler, 1997) and single-parent and
cohabiting families tend to allocate a smaller share of their budget towards child-related goods, such
as education (Ziol-Guest et al., 2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005). Brown (2002) ﬁnds that cohabiting
mothers are more likely to be psychologically distressed than married mothers and suggests that this
difference stems from the greater uncertainty regarding the future of the union. Social norms and family
traditions affecting the intergenerational transfer of resources may also beneﬁt marital unions more. For
5instance, Eggebeen (2005) ﬁnds that cohabiting couples are less likely than married couples to receive
help from their parents.
This paper focuses on the effect of marriage between the biological parents on child wellbeing. Bi-
ological parents may make greater investments in their children than non-biological parents for several
reasons. First, biological parents may be more emotionally attached to the child and feel more responsi-
ble for the child’s wellbeing. Second, the returns from child investments may be higher for a biological
parent. The biological father may be more involved since the child can continue his family lineage and
ascertain future intergenerational transfers (Case and McLanahan, 2000). Third, the biological father
may be required by law to pay child support regardless of his relationship status with the mother.4
Selection into Marriage
Economic theories of marriage argue that individuals optimally select a mate to exploit the gains to
marriage, subject to marriage market conditions and individual endowments (Becker, 1973; Lam, 1988;
McElroy and Horney, 1981). Lam (1988) shows that individuals have an incentive to be positively
assortatively matched with a partner when the production of household (public) goods requires the
inputs of both partners (“joint production”) and negatively assortatively matched in the presence of
gains to specialization. Consistent with the importance of jointly produced goods in modern households
(e.g., family activities), spouses are typically found to be similar in key attributes including age, race,
education, and other socioeconomic characteristics (Epstein and Guttman, 1984).
However, little is known about the characteristics and mating patterns of couples who marry after
having children. Willis (1999) argues that unmarried parents should have less favorable characteristics
and be less (positively) assortatively matched than married parents. Consistent with this hypothesis,
married parents have been found to be of higher socioeconomic status than unwed parents (Brown,
2004), and unmarried couples tend to be less (positively) assortatively matched (Garﬁnkel et al., 2002).
As argued in Brown and Booth (1996), these differences in attributes may be a symptom of lower
4The Family Support Act of 1988 requires states to establish legal paternity for all births, apply child support formulas
based on a father’s resources, establish stronger collection procedures. If a child is born out-of-wedlock and the father
disputes paternity, the court determines paternity via DNA testing.
6relationship quality, with adverse effects on children, and may contribute to the greater instability found
among unmarried parents relative to married parents.
Non-random selection into marriage complicates the estimation of the marriage effect. Simple com-
parisons of child outcomes by marital status can be misleading if couples who get married are different
from those who remain unmarried in ways that also affect child investments. Given the limited under-
standing of the determinants of marriage among out-of-wedlock parents, the direction and magnitude
of the potential selection bias in the estimated marriage effect is a priori ambiguous. For example,
if couples with characteristics that beneﬁt child development are also more likely to get married, the
beneﬁts of marriage may be overstated. Conversely, if couples with poorer traits are more likely to get
married after childbearing, a negative association between marriage and child wellbeing may arise. For
instance, the social stigma of non-marital childbearing may induce some poorly matched or endowed
couples to marry. In turn, child wellbeing may be adversely affected as these parents face greater
difﬁculties in realizing gains to specialization or coordinating the production of child quality.
3 Statistical Model and Estimation Strategy
Conceptual Model
Consider a (romantically involved) couple i that has a child out-of-wedlock. The interrelation of child
outcomes, parental investments in children, and parents’ marital status may be formalized as :
Ci = bMi+gXi+ei (1)
Mi = dXi+ni (2)
whereCi denotes the observed child outcome of couple i. Mi is equals to (1) if the couple marries after
childbirth and (0) otherwise. Characteristics of couple i that inﬂuence their child investment and marital
decisions are captured in Xi. Unobservables affecting Ci and Mi are captured by ei and ni, respectively.
The effect of marriage on child wellbeing is captured by b. However, estimating Eq. (1) directly
7may yield a biased estimate of b if Mi and ei are statistically dependent. This dependence can arise from
two sources (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman and Robb, 1985): ﬁrst, couples’ characteristics
(child investments) may be correlated with unmeasured child endowments, i.e., Xi and ei are correlated;
and second, bias may arise due to unobservable factors that affect both the child outcomes and the
couple’s marital status, i.e., correlation between ei and ni. The existence of either source of bias would
likely show that children of married parents to have different outcomes from their peers whose parents
remained unmarried, independent of any true causal effect of marriage on child outcomes.
Selection bias can arise in regression analysis as these estimators employ data from all observations
to be combined into one estimate of the marriage effect. If parents who marry tend to differ markedly
from parents who remained unmarried, the validity of the estimate would be suspect since the com-
bining functions operate over very different families. Speciﬁcally, the marriage effect is identiﬁed by
comparing the average outcome of children whose parents married to those with parents who did not.
In the presence of any characteristics that affect the couples’ decision to marry as well as child well-
being, the resulting estimate will reﬂect both the “true” effect of parents’ marriage on children whose
parents married and effects of factors that inﬂuenced the parents’ decision to marry in the ﬁrst place.
This study builds on the potential outcome approach to investigate the effect of parents’ marriage
after childbearing on child outcomes. The relationship between parents’ marriage and child outcomes
is formulated in a framework similar to a social experiment in which the treatment is randomly as-
signed. In the present context, the “treatment” – parents’ marriage – is deﬁned in terms of the potential
outcomes for children whose parents married (treated). We draw on matching methods (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983; Heckman and Robb, 1985) to construct the counterfactual outcomes for the treated in
the absence of treatment, by matching the treated with controls (children whose parents remained un-
married) who share identical characteristics that rule selection into treatment. While our methodology
addresses selection on observables but does not readily extend to selection on unobservables,5 we rely
5The instrumental variables strategy provides an alternative to account for selection into marriage. However, ﬁnding a
suitable instrument for marriage is difﬁcult. State and local marriage restrictions have been used as instruments for marriage
but are problematic for several reasons: (1) state and local marriage restrictions may not detect any effects of marriage if
few people are close to the margin where these restrictions matter; (2) even if these policies have measurable effects on
marriage, Ribar (2006) points out that they might only be enacted in areas with particular socioeconomic characteristics or
8on the richness of the FFCWS to reduce selection bias generated by unobservables. The advantage of
FFCWS is that it contains detailed information on both biological parents and their romantic involve-
ment previously unavailable for out-of-wedlock children in large representative datasets, allowing us to
account for many important determinants of marriage.
Potential Outcome Approach
Let the “treatment” be the marriage between the parents of child i after his/er birth: Mi = 1 denotes the
“treatment group” (children whose parents marry), and Mi = 0 denotes the “control group” (children
whose parents remain unmarried). LetCi(1) denote the potential outcome of child i under the treatment
state (Mi = 1), and Ci(0) the potential child outcome if the same child i receives no treatment (Mi =
0). Thus, Ci = MiCi(1) + (1¡Mi)Ci(0) is the observed outcome of child i. The individual treatment
effect, bi = Ci(1) ¡ Ci(0), is unobserved since either Ci(1) orCi(0) is missing.
Standard parametric methods (e.g. OLS) estimates the average treatment effect (ATE) by taking the
average outcome difference between the treatment groups: bOLS = E[Ci(1)jMi =1] ¡ E[Ci(0)jMi =0],
the average of the treatment effect on the treated and the treatment effect on the controls. If many par-
ents who remained unmarried are unlikely to ever marry, the ATE may not be particularly illuminating
in answering how parents’ marriage has affected children whose parents transitioned into marriage. An
alternative is to focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET):
bMi=1 = E[bijMi = 1] = E[Ci(1)jMi = 1]¡E[Ci(0)jMi = 1] (3)
which is the difference between the expected outcome of a child whose parents marry, and the expected
outcome of the same child if his/er parents were to remain unmarried.
While we observe the outcomes of children of married parents, and thus able to construct the ﬁrst
as a result of concerns about local marriage and wellbeing trends; and (3) Card (1999) points out that instruments can also
fail when there are differences across people in the effects of an event, like marriage, which subsequently affect people’s
decision-making. Consider the case in which there is exogenous variation in marriage restrictions across areas. In areas with
burdensome restrictions, only people who foresee large gains to marriage will marry, while in areas with few restrictions,
even people who foresee smaller gains will marry. In this case, the size of the marriage effect varies systematically with the
otherwise exogenous costs of marriage.
9expectation E[Ci(1)jMi =1], we cannot identify the counterfactual expectation E[Ci(0)jMi =1] without
invoking further assumptions. To overcome this problem, one has to rely on children whose parents
remain unmarried to obtain information on the counterfactual outcome. Random assignment of couples
into treatment would solve this problem but infeasible in this context. In this non-experimental setting,
replacing E[Ci(0)jMi =1] directly with E[Ci(0)jMi =0] is inappropriate since union formation is likely
non-random and many untreated may have characteristics that differ substantially from the treated.
Matching
Statistical matching is a way to construct a sample counterpart for the counterfactual outcomes of the
treated had they not receivedtreatment. Matching estimators can be devisedto reconstruct the condition
of an experiment by stratifying the sample with respect to covariates Xi that rule selection into treat-
ment. Selection bias is eliminated provided all variables in Xi are measured and balanced (comparable)
between the two treatment groups within each stratum. In this case, each stratum represents a separate
randomized experiment and simple outcome difference between the treated and controls provide an
unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). An identifying assumption of the matching method is
that all relevant outcome differences between the matched treated and controls are captured in their
observed characteristics. The CIA requires that, conditional on observables X, the distribution of po-
tential outcomes of the treated in the absence of treatment to be the same as the outcome distribution
of the controls. Hence, conditional on X, the outcomes of children whose parents remained unmarried
are what the outcomes of children of married parents would have been if their parents had remained
unmarried.6 The conditional response of the treated under no treatment can thus be estimated by the
conditional mean response of the matched untreated.
6Moreover, it assumes that there are untreated units for each x: Pr(Mi = 0 j Xi = x) > 0 for all x. This implies that
individuals are matched only over the common support region of Xi where the treated and untreated overlap.
10Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATET). Following the CIA, the ATET can be computed as:
bjMi=1 = E[Ci(1) j Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Mi = 1] (4)
= EX[E[Ci(1) j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 1] j Mi = 1]
= EX[E[Ci(1) j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 0] j Mi = 1]
= EX[E[Ci j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci j Xi;Mi = 0] j Mi = 1]:
To estimate the ATET, one is to ﬁrst take the outcome difference between the two treatment groups
conditional on X, then average over the distribution of the observables in the treated population.
Conditioning on X within a ﬁnite sample can be problematic if the vector of observables is of high
dimension, as the number of matching cells increases exponentially with the number of covariates in
X. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed using the propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability
of selection into treatment p(Xi) = Pr(Mi = 1 j Xi = x) = E(Mi j Xi), to stratify the sample. They
showed that by deﬁnition the treated and the non-treated with the same propensity score have the
same distribution of X: Xi ? Mi j p(Xi) (known as the balancing property of the propensity score).
Furthermore, if Ci(0) ? Mi j Xi, then Ci(0) ? Mi j p(Xi). This implies that matching can be performed
on p(Xi) alone, thus reducing the dimensionality problem into a single variable p(Xi).
Matching treated and untreated units using their estimated propensity scores and placing them into
one block (i.e., observations with propensity scores falling within a speciﬁc range) means that selection
into treatment within each block is random and the probability of receiving treatment within this block
equals the propensity score. Consequently, the difference between the treated and the untreated average
outcomes at any value of p(Xi) is an unbiased estimate of the ATET at that value of p(Xi).
Kernel Matching Estimators. Since p(Xi) is a continuous variable, the probability of ﬁnding an exact
match is theoretically zero. Therefore, a certain distance between the treated and untreated has to be
accepted (see Becker and Ichino, 2002).
Kernel matching matches all treated observations with a weighted average of all controls with
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the treated
11and controls, with the Gaussian kernel assigning weights that follows a normal distribution, and the
Epanechinikov kernel following a triangular distribution. In radius matching (uniform kernel), each
treated is matched only with controls whose propensity score fall within a predeﬁned neighborhood
(“radius”) of its propensity score. All matches within this radius are assigned the same weight. If the
dimension of the neighborhood is deﬁned to be very small, it is possible that some treated units are not
matched because the neighborhood does not contain any control units. Conversely, the smaller the size
of the neighborhood the better the quality of the matches.
There are tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of the matches among these estimators but
none is a priori superior. Relative to radius matching, Gaussian and Epanechinikov matching tend
to produce higher quantity of matches; however, match quality may be poorer since treated units are
potentially matched with distant controls. Nevertheless, their joint consideration offers a way to assess
the robustness of our results.7
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our study sample consists of 958 children born to romantically-involved unmarried parents drawn from
the FFCWS. The FFCWS collected data on a cohort of 4;898 births across 16 U.S. cities between 1998
to 2000. The weighted sample is representative of births in large U.S. cities in 1999. The FFCWS is
unique as it provides information on a large set of children born to unmarried parents in various living
arrangements and relationship structures. Within the original cohort, 3;600 were born to unmarried
parents. Both biological parents were interviewed at the time of childbirth, when the child reaches age
one, and again at age three. Areas such as parent-parent and parent-child relationships, socioeconomic
activities, and child development are covered.
At the three-year follow-up, the FFCWS collects data from a random subsample of the core re-
spondents (n = 2;368) on various domains of the child’s environment, called the “36-Month In-Home
Longitudinal Study of Pre-School Aged Children.” As part of the In-Home survey, the PPVT is ad-
7Due to the small sample size, we employ matching with replacement. Matching with replacement reduces bias but
increase the variance.
12ministered to the child by the interviewer. The PPVT has been shown to be predictive of subsequent
intellectual ability and achievement (Dunn and Dunn, 1981).
Sample Selection
Our study sample is selected as follows. First, given that the child outcome measures are available
only through the 36-Month In-Home survey, children not part of the survey (2;530 cases) are ex-
cluded. Second, we focus on children born to unmarried biological parents who were romantically
involved at childbirth (i.e., either in cohabiting or visiting8 unions): children born to married parents
(508 cases) or not romantically involved parents (221 cases) are excluded. Third, to keep track of
the history of parental relationship transitions, biological parents whose relationship status cannot be
ascertained at baseline (349 cases), one-year follow-up (141 cases), or the three-year follow-up (69
cases) are dropped. Fourth, we cross check the marriage date (available since the one-year follow-up)
with parents’ reported marital status at childbirth. Observations in which the marriage date contradicts
with the reported marital status of the parents at childbirth are dropped (six cases). Another 23 cases
are dropped due to missing information on important socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.9
The resulting sample consists of 1;051 children all born out-of-wedlock. Finally, we construct the
“matched sample” by estimating the propensity score of selection into treatment within this sample.
Observations with propensity scores falling outside of the common support region are excluded from
the analysis (six treated and 87 controls), resulting in the ﬁnal sample of 958 children.10
Sample Descriptives
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the measures used in this study. Sample descriptives are ﬁrst
presented for the entire sample (columns 1 and 2), and columns 3 and 4 present the variable means
for the treated and control groups, respectively. The main outcome measure is child cognitive ability,
8The FFCWS asks the parents to report their romantic involvement and living arrangements. “Visiting” parents refers to
couples who are romantically involved but living separately.
9Our results are robust to the exclusion of these observations (available upon request).
10Our results are robust to the exclusion of observations outside of the common support region (available upon request).
13measured by the child’s standardized PPVT score administered at age three.11 The mean PPVT score
in our sample is 84:9. Relative to peers whose parents remained unmarried, children whose parents
marry within three years after childbirth display signiﬁcantly higher cognitive ability at age three.
Among children with parents who transition into marriage within three years after childbirth (20%
of the sample): (1) 81% had cohabiting parents at birth, and (2) approximately half of their parents got
married within the ﬁrst year after childbirth (not shown). Among parents who remained unmarried by
wavethree(notshown), 53%remainromanticallyinvolvedineithercohabitingorvisitingrelationships.
Among parents who are no longer romantically involved with each other at wave three, 139 (38%)
mothers report to be romantically involved with new partners.
Who Gets Married? Parents who marry after childbirth differ markedly from parents who remained
unmarried (henceforth “persistently unmarried”) in various dimensions: on average, they tend to be
older, more educated, more likely to participate in the labor market, have higher earnings and house-
hold income. Unmarried parents who transitioned into marriage after childbearing also tend to be less
assortatively matched relative to those who remained unmarried: they are more likely to differ in racial
backgrounds, and the mother tends to be more educated than the father. While the descriptive assorta-
tive mating patterns are not statistically different by treatment status, they may be correlated with other
characteristics of the partners which will to be addressed in a multivariate setting in the next section.
Parentswhomarry are morelikelytohaveknowntheir partnerfor lessthan sixmonths priorto preg-
nancy, compared to persistently unmarried parents. These fathers are also less likely to have suggested
abortion during pregnancy. Proposing abortion during pregnancy may indicate whether the pregnancy
was planned; however, it may also reﬂect the father’s attitudes towards abortion and marriage. Consis-
tent with Thornton et al. (1992), we ﬁnd that mothers who marry their child’s father after childbirth are
more likely to be Catholic and participate in religious activities frequently. This evidence is consistent
with the proposition that for many parents who are potentially against abortion and/or face higher social
stigma of raising children out-of-wedlock, an unintended pregnancy may provide a strong incentive to
marry even if the quality of the partners’ match is poor and/or uncertain.
11The PPVT scores are normalized against a national population with a mean of 100 and a variance of 15 points.
145 Estimation Results
Estimating the Propensity Score of Marriage
The ﬁrst step in implementing the matching method is to estimate the propensity score for selection
into treatment under study, p(Xi) = p(Mi = 1jXi). The propensity score is deﬁned as the probability
of the parents transitioning into marriage within three years after childbirth. We estimate this process
using a probit noting that other probability models yield similar results.
One issue is what covariates to include in the probit. We rely on the proposition by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983), which asserts that conditional on the propensity score, the covariates are mean-
independent of assignment into treatment, so that for observations with the same propensity score, the
distribution of covariates should be the same across the treatment and control groups. Conditioning
on the propensity score, each observation has the same probability of assignment into treatment, as
in a randomized experiment. Following the algorithm proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), for
any given speciﬁcation (we begin by including the simplest set of controls), observations are grouped
into blocks deﬁned by the estimated propensity score and check whether we succeed in balancing the
covariates between the treated and controls within each block. If we are unable to ﬁnd a partition
structure in which the covariates are balanced, indicating that the speciﬁcation does not fully capture
the differences between the treated and controls , additional covariates are included until this condition
is satisﬁed.
Parents’ marriage decision may respond to children’s favorable characteristics. For example, two
well-documented regularities are the greater risk of divorce following the birth of a female child or a
child with poor health (Lundberg et al., 2007; Reichman et al., 2004). Furthermore, unmarried parents
in relatively stable relationships (cohabitors and couples with multiple children together) may be more
likely to marry than new couples. In our simplest probit speciﬁcation, we control for child gender, birth
order, whether the child is of low birth weight (< 88 ozs),12 and parents’ baseline relationship status
(cohabiting vs. visiting). Successively we add household income, mothers socioeconomic and demo-
12This is consistent with the deﬁnition of low birth weight in the medical literature.
15graphic characteristics, and father’s characteristics, respectively. Including additional covariates in X
improves the ﬁt of the propensity score model (pseudo R2 increases from 0:075 to 0:165), but signiﬁ-
cant differences in covariate means between the treated and control groups remain, which constitutes a
well-deﬁned criterion for rejecting these more parsimonious speciﬁcations.
The covariate means are ﬁnally balanced when we additionally include parental assortative mating
patterns and relationship characteristics.13 Table 2 presents results of the balancing test between the
treatment and control groups both before (column 1) and after stratifying the sample into blocks based
on their estimated propensity scores (columns 2- 7). As expected, the treated and control groups differ
substantially prior to matching. Post-matching (condition on the propensity score), however, the char-
acteristics of the matched controls within each block resemble closely to that of the treated group, as
the covariate means between the treated and control units within each block are statistically equivalent,
showing that the balancing condition is satisﬁed.
Matching based on the full set of covariates results in a sample of 958 observations with propensity
scores falling within the region of common support [0:02025512;0:77094784].14 Figure 1 illustrates
the diagnostic value of the propensity score within the common support. The ﬁgure shows that the
treated and controls are comparable as there is sufﬁcient overlap in their propensity scores within each
block, while in the extreme bins there is only limited overlap. This can be expected since the number of
treated units increases and the number of control units decreases at high values of the propensity score.
Note that this does not generate bias in the estimates as long as the balancing property is satisﬁed.
Table 3 presents the probit estimates of the propensity score for the fully-speciﬁed model. Com-
pared to persistently unmarried mothers (holding everything else constant), unwed mothers who marry
their child’s father after childbirth are signiﬁcantly more likely to be more educated than the father.
Weiss and Willis (1997) ﬁnds that the lack of positive assortative mating with respect to education,
contributes to martial instability. The results also show that parents who marry after childbirth are
13Details of the balancing tests based on more parsimonious speciﬁcations and additional sensitivity analysis regarding
the CIA assumption are available upon request.
14The lower bound of the common support is deﬁned by the minimum propensity score within the treated group, and the
upper bound is deﬁned by the maximum propensity score of the control group.
16more likely to have known each other for less than six months prior to pregnancy, to have been cohabit-
ing at childbirth and to attend religious activities often (mother). These ﬁndings are consistent with the
idea that among couples who have children out-of-wedlock, those who potentially face higher social
barriers to raising children out-of-wedlock are more likely to transition into marriage, even though they
may be less well-matched (assortatively).
Effect of Parents’ Marriage after Childbearing on Child Cognitive Ability
Table 4 presents the estimated effect of parents’ marriage after childbirth on child cognitive ability
at age three measured by the PPVT score. We ﬁrst report the OLS estimates: column 1 shows the
unadjusted mean difference in the PPVT score between the (unmatched) treatment groups (i.e., OLS
regression without any controls), and column 2 reports the mean outcome difference between the (un-
matched) treatment groups after adjusting for the full set of controls. The PSM estimates based on the
Gaussian, Epanechnikov, and uniform (radius) kernel matching estimators are reported in columns 3
- 7, respectively. To assess the sensitivity of the matching estimates to the choice of bandwidth (or
radius), we report results using different bandwidths (or radii).15
On average, out-of-wedlock children whose parents marry score 3:073 points higher on the PPVT
than their peers with persistently unmarried parents. Differences in observable parental and child char-
acteristics partially explain the outcome differences between the treated and controls: the marriage
effect estimated by the OLS is reduced to 2:158 after controlling for the full set of covariates, but
remains statistically signiﬁcant. While the matching estimates conﬁrm the direction of the marriage
effect implied by the parametric results, they suggest that parents’ marriage increases the child’s PPVT
score by 3:5 to 4:4 points (¼ 1=4th of a standard deviation) relative to if the parents had remained
unmarried. Simple correlations we obtained based on a cohort of young adults from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (Cohort 1979) suggest that a four point increase in the PPVT score at age
three may raise the odds of high school graduation by two percentage points.
Selection into marriage partially explains the differences in child outcomes between out-of-wedlock
15Details on the choice of bandwidth are available upon request.
17children whose parents later marry and those who do not. We note that the matching estimates are larger
in magnitude and statistically different from the parametric estimates, indicating that the parametric
estimate may be biased towards zero. This is consistent with economic theory of marriage (Becker,
1973, 1974): couples who can realize larger gains to marriage are more likely to marry, those who see
little gains will remain unmarried.
Recall that many parents who transitioned into marriage exhibit characteristics that may not be
conducive for a healthy marriage and potentially face higher risk of union dissolution. Becker et al.
(1977)arguesthatastheunionbecomeslessstable, fewerinvestmentsintherelationship orotherpublic
goods, such as children, are made. The ﬁnding that, on average, the outcome difference between a given
treated child and a child in the control group who does not (necessarily) share similar disadvantages
is smaller (OLS) than the outcome difference between the same treated child and a control child who
does share these disadvantages (PSM) implies that at least for some children in the treated group,
in particular those whose parents exhibit these disadvantaged characteristics, having their parents get
married yields greater beneﬁts relative to others in the treated group.
As discussed above, marriage may foster child wellbeing for a number of reasons including greater
time and skill endowments, economies of scale, specialization, and greater incentives to allocate re-
sources towards children. Differences in parental time and skill endowments are less plausible expla-
nations, since we match children of married parents with children of unmarried parents who are similar
regarding their relationship status at childbirth, levels of education, household income, labor force par-
ticipation, and differentials in parents’ traits. Given that some of these potential beneﬁts to marriage
should extend to cohabiting parents as well (e.g., economies of scale), we re-estimated the models ex-
cluding children whose parents do not co-reside at age three. The results indicate smaller cognitive
outcome differences between the treated and controls with cohabiting parents, as shown in the bottom
panel of Table 4. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the estimated beneﬁts to marriage partly
reﬂect resource gains that accrue when forming a two-parent household.
This subsample analysis results in a signiﬁcantly reduced sample and increased standard errors of
the marriage coefﬁcients, causing the estimated marriage effects to be no longer statistically signiﬁcant
18while remaining positive with a magnitude of about 2 points. Outcome differences between children
of married vs. cohabiting parents may be attributable to the institutional and socio-cultural beneﬁts
of marriage. While unmarried parenthood is less stigmatized today, it still does not enjoy the same
legal and social recognition as childrearing within marriage (Durst, 1997; Mahoney, 2002). Without
the marriage contract parents face fewer incentives to take advantage of gains to specialization and to
allocate resources towards a child. Consistent with this, compared to families with married parents,
cohabiting and single-parent families tend to devote a smaller share of the family budget to their chil-
dren (Ziol-Guest et al., 2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005), spent less time with their children (Hofferth
and Anderson, 2003), and face greater difﬁculties in monitoring and disciplining them (Brown, 2002).
Moreover, Nock (1995) and Brown and Booth (1996) ﬁnd that cohabiting couples tend to be less happy
and less committed to their relationships than married couples.
Finally, among mothers who are no longer romantically involved with the child’s biological father
three years after childbirth (47% of the control group), seven report to be married and 53 to be cohabit-
ing with new partners when the child reaches age three (not shown). Although stepparents potentially
contribute to children both in terms of their time and ﬁnancial resources, some evidence indicates that
non-biological parents tend to be less involved with stepchildren as compared to biological parents
(Hofferth and Anderson, 2003) — and may in some cases disrupt relations with the absent parent (Am-
ato, 1998). Indeed, Hofferth (2004) ﬁnds that even after accounting for differences in socioeconomic
situations between these family types, children raised in stepparent families appear to fare just about
as poorly as children raised in single-parent families, and worse than children living with their married
biological parents. While sub-sample analysis is not warranted due to the small sample size, previous
ﬁndings would suggest that additionally accounting for the presence of a stepparent would do little to
amend the differences in child outcomes found in the present study.
19Child Health and Behavioral Outcomes
Asthma is the most common chronic illness affecting children, with symptoms formulated since in-
fancy.16 Genetic predispositions combined with exposure to environmental toxins and poor health
investments are common risk factors for asthma onset (Neidell, 2004). Psychological stress is also
known to aggravate asthma, and the relationship between stressful life events and asthma onset has
been well established among the adult population (e.g., Kilpel¨ ainen et al., 2002). Recent research point
to stress experienced by a caretaker as an independent factor contributing to child asthma (Wright et
al., 2002). Stressful life events, such as parental relationship conﬂicts, have been found to be associ-
ated with asthma onset in infants, mainly through the mother’s coping abilities that translate into her
parenting ineffectiveness (Klinnert et al., 1994). We categorize a child as to have asthma (Yi = 1) if
his/er mother reports that her child has asthma or has had asthma attacks (or she was ever informed by
a health care professional that the child has asthma).17
Early childhood behavior outcomes are operationalized using maternal reports of aggressive be-
havior,18 attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional deﬁant disorder (ODD), and
an instrument of prosocial behavior (“Express subscale”) taken from the Adaptive Social Behavioral
Inventory (ASBI).19 Both ADHD and ODD are considered clinical scales: ADHD, a neurobehavioral
disorder characterized by pervasive inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity resulting in signiﬁcant
functional impairment; and ODD, a psychiatric disorder that is characterized by aggressiveness and a
tendency to purposefully bother and irritate others.20
Appendix Table 1 presents a detailed list of items used to construct the behavioral scales and the
16Source: “Asthma in Children Fact Sheet,” American Lung Association, 2004.
17This is consistent with the standard deﬁnition of childhood asthma (“America’s Children: Key National Indicators of
Well-Being, 2001,” Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, Washington D.C.: U.S. Printing Ofﬁce).
18Aggressive behavior is a subscale taken from the Child Behavior Checklist 2-3 (CBCL, Achenbach, 1992). The CBCL
is well established for use with children under age ﬁve, and has been shown to effectively identify children who are referred
to mental health services (Achenbach, 1992).
19The ASBI was developed to assess multiple components of social competence in young children (Hogan et al., 1992).
The full ASBI scale includes 30 items to evaluate three dimensions of social competence in children, labeled “Express,”
“Comply,” and “Disrupt.” These three subscales correspond to prosocial, internalizing, and externalizing behaviors found
in children. The FFCWS, however, only provides information on a subset of the items included in the “Express” dimension
(henceforth the ASBI express subscale).
20Source: National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, 2005.
20associated Cronbach’s alpha.21 Mothers were asked to rate the child with respect to each of these items
with 0 = (not true), 1 = (somewhat or sometimes true), and 2 = (very true or often true). The Cron-
bach’s alphas reveal that the item scales used to measure each of the underlying behavioral outcomes
are quite reliable within our sample. For instance, an a of 0:880 implies the correlation between the set
of items included and the underlying factor measuring aggressive behavior is
p
a ¼ 0:938.
We deﬁne the behavioral outcome variables as follows: for aggressive behavior, ADHD, and ODD,
sum scale scores are standardized and we use a cut-off of t-scores greater than or equal to 63. This cut-
offpointdemarcatesemotionalandbehavioralproblemsatorabovethe90th percentileinthepopulation
of children as a whole and represents borderline clinical range (Achenbach and Rescorla, 2000). About
10% of the children in our sample meet the criterion for aggressive disorder, 10% for ADHD, and 9%
for ODD at the borderline clinical cut-off (not shown). To measure the child’s competence in prosocial
(expressive) behavior, mother’s mean response to the listed items is used.
Table 5 presents the estimated effects of parents’ marriage after childbearing on child asthma and
behavioral outcomes measured at age three. We ﬁnd that children whose parents marry are 1% - 3%
less likely to develop asthma/asthma attack by age three compared to children of persistently unmarried
parents; however these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero at conventional
levels. Consistent with Heiland and Liu (2006), we ﬁnd no evidence that marriage following childbirth
affects child behavioral outcomes, as none of these estimates are statistically different from zero. One
possible cause for the absence of effects using these outcomes is measurement error. There may be
systematic reporting bias in the mother’s evaluation of her child’s health and behavioral problems.
Brown (2002) ﬁnds that cohabiting mothers are more likely to report more mental health problems than
married mothers, and poor maternal mental health may increase a mother’s likelihood of perceiving
more behavioral problems in her children (Friedlander et al., 1986). A recent study by Meadows et al.
(2007), however, ﬁnds that mother’s appraisals of many of these child behavioral outcomes correspond
closely with independent observer assessments.
21The Cronbach’s alpha assesses the reliability of a summative rating scale composed of variables speciﬁed. The relia-
bility a is deﬁned as the square of the correlation between the measured scale and the underlying factor.
21Additional analysis supports the idea that marriage is particularly beneﬁcial for child (verbal) cog-
nitive development. While mothers who marry after childbirth in the FFCWS read to their children
about as frequently as persistently unmarried mothers, children of married mothers tend to have more
reading materials at home (speciﬁcally children’s books) than their peers in unmarried families (p-value
= 0:018). Married mothers also possess better verbal abilities as indicated by their higher PPVT scores
(see Table 1). This suggests that the quality of verbal stimulation that children receive within marriage
may be better. On the other hand, there is no evidence that married and unmarried parents differ signif-
icantly with respect to behaviors that are known to impede child health and behavioral development.22
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that married and unmarried parents in our sample display similar prevalence of
smoking and are equally likely to discipline their children using physical or negative verbal (including
yelling, cursing, and threatening) punishment.
6 Conclusion
Using a recent, large representative sample of children all born to unmarried parents, this study ex-
amines how marriage between the biological parents within three years after childbirth affects child
cognitive, health, and behavioral outcomes at age three. Adopting a potential outcome approach to
account for parental self-selection into marriage, we compare outcomes between children who share
similar parental background characteristics and assortative mating patterns and differ only in terms of
whether their parents marry or not. While we ﬁnd no evidence of an effect of marriage on the child’s
risk of developing asthma or behavioral problems, marriage is found to enhance child cognitive abil-
ity. Parenting behavior and the quality of child investments may help explain these results: while we
ﬁnd no evidence that married and unmarried parents differ signiﬁcantly with respect to behaviors that
are known to hinder child health and behavioral development, our evidence points to married mothers
providing higher-quality verbal stimulation important for child cognitive development.
The analysis contributes to a better understanding of the complex relationship between family for-
22Smoking in the household and aggressive verbal or physical punishment has been shown to adversely affect child health
(e.g., increaseasthmarisk)andbehavioraldevelopment, respectively(e.g., Weitzmanetal., 1990; HaoandMatsueda, 2006).
22mation and child development among the growing population of unmarried couples with children. It
also sheds light on the characteristics and mating patterns of unmarried parents. Among unmarried par-
ents, we ﬁnd that those couples who potentially face a greater stigma of out-of-wedlock childrearing
and those who are less similar in terms of their educational attainments are more likely to transition
into marriage after childbirth. The latter result is interesting since married couples in general tend to
be (positively) assortatively matched by education (e.g., Pencavel, 1998). Our analysis also provides
some evidence that those out-of-wedlock children whose parents get married enjoy particularly large
gains from marriage. Marriage being especially beneﬁcial for children with parents of different edu-
cation levels is consistent with the idea that the marital bond facilitates specialization, especially for
these couples. By ensuring compensation for sacriﬁces made on behalf of the family (e.g., via al-
imony rights), marriage provides those fathers with relatively low education—and hence low earnings
power—with a greater incentive to contribute time towards the production of family public goods (e.g.,
by taking on more childcare responsibilities), thereby allowing their more educated spouses to allocate
their time more efﬁciently between market and home production.
We ﬁnd that out-of-wedlock children’s cognitive development beneﬁts from their biological parents
marriage. While more research on the mechanisms through which marriage beneﬁts these children
is needed, our ﬁndings are consistent with the greater availability of time and material resources in
two-parent households playing an important role in explaining the outcome differences. All else equal,
marriage of the biological parents may increase family resources and child investments beyond the lev-
els of cohabiting unions. The lack of full legal and social recognition of cohabiting parenthood may
lessen their incentives to take advantage of opportunities to specialize in market vs. home production
and to allocate time and material resources towards children. Evidence of cohabiting parents devoting
smaller shares of the family budget on children and spending less time with them (Ziol-Guest et al,
2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005; Hofferth and Anderson, 2003), and evidence that cohabiting relation-
ships tend to last longer once they are granted the same alimony rights (Lafortune, 2007) support this
interpretation.
We note that while the matching approach adopted here addresses selection effects driven by dif-
23ferences in observable characteristics between married and unmarried parents, it is possible that there
remain important unobservables that we do not account for. For instance, although we account for as-
sortative mating patterns in terms of age, race, education, and labor market activities, couples’ compati-
bility in less tangible dimensions such as social views, maturity, and marital expectations may also have
important implications on whether they transition into marriage and how their children will be raised
(e.g., Waller and McLanahan, 2005). Furthermore, marriage may depend on transitory in addition to
permanent or pre-childbirth family characteristics. Studies focusing on the low-income population of-
ten found that both partners’ education and earnings are important determinants of whether a couple
can afford to marry (Sweeney, 2002). Hence, improvements in the couples’ socioeconomic status are
likely to increase their odds of marriage and positively inﬂuence child development as well.
The analysis also contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the merits of encouraging marriage
among unwed parents. Our ﬁndings on child cognitive development are consistent with the idea that
out-of-wedlock children beneﬁt from their parents establishing a joint household and entering marriage.
However, it is important to recognize that parents of out-of-wedlock children who get married may
not have characteristics conducive for a stable relationship over the long-haul. Our ﬁnding that the
parents of out-of-wedlock children who get married within three years after child birth tend to be less
(positively) assortatively matched than couples who do not get married raises the concern that these
marriages will face high rates of marital instability (e.g., Weiss and Willis, 1997). The early child
cognitive developmental gain from marriage that we document here may, in turn, be offset by the
adverse effects of divorce. As additional waves of the FFCWS will become available over the next
years, it may be feasible to investigate the longer-term effects of marriage on child development.
Lastly, we note that our ﬁndings do not readily speak to whether the large differences in child
outcomes typically found between children born to married vs. unmarried parents should be interpreted
as causal effects of marriage. Although the FFCWS includes a subsample of children born to married
parents, an application of the potential outcome approach to assess the effect of marriage between
children born to married vs. unmarried parents is infeasible since pre-marital information on parents
who were married at baseline is very limited.
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29Table 1: Sample Descriptives
Parents’ Marital Status




Child PPVT Score (Age 3) 84:91 [15:74] 87:37 84:30¤
Parents’ Relationship at Childbirth
Cohabiting 0:637 [0:481] 0:813 0:597¤
Visiting 0:363 [0:481] 0:187 0:403¤
Child Characteristics
Child is of low birth weight (< 88 oz) 0:099 [0:298] 0:081 0:103
Child is female 0:469 [0:499] 0:490 0:464
Child’s birth order (mother):
- 1st 0:342 [0:474] 0:323 0:345
- 2nd 0:329 [0:470] 0:333 0:328
- 3rd or higher 0:304 [0:460] 0:328 0:299
Parent’s Demographic Characteristics
Mother’s age < 20 at childbirth 0:242 [0:428] 0:177 0:257¤
Father’s age < 20 at childbirth 0:119 [0:324] 0:063 0:132¤
Mother’s race/ethnicity:
- white 0:156 [0:363] 0:214 0:143¤
- black 0:575 [0:495] 0:367 0:623¤
- Hispanic 0:243 [0:429] 0:388 0:210¤
- other 0:025 [0:156] 0:031 0:023
Father’s race/ethnicity:
- white 0:115 [0:319] 0:192 0:097¤
- black 0:615 [0:487] 0:414 0:661¤
- Hispanic 0:238 [0:426] 0:369 0:208¤
- other 0:032 [0:177] 0:025 0:034
Parents of different race/ethnicity 0:145 [0:011] 0:156 0:142
Mother is foreign-born 0:058 [0:234] 0:116 0:045¤
Father is foreign-born 0:179 [0:383] 0:192 0:176
Child’s Household Income
Income less than $10;000 0:219 [0:414] 0:137 0:239¤
Income between $10;000 and $24;999 0:348 [0:477] 0:355 0:347
Income at least $25;000 0:433 [0:496] 0:508 0:415¤









- high school diploma / GED 0:370 [0:483] 0:318 0:382+
- some college 0:245 [0:430] 0:303 0:231¤
- bachelor & beyond 0:027 [0:161] 0:045 0:022
Father’s education:
- high school diploma / GED 0:385 [0:487] 0:333 0:397+
- some college 0:224 [0:417] 0:242 0:219
- bachelor & beyond 0:024 [0:152] 0:076 0:012¤
Parents’ Labor Market Activities
Mother works 0:188 [0:391] 0:222 0:181
Mother’s weekly hours of work 35:11 [9:065] 36:36 34:75
Mother’s annual labor income:
- less than $10;000 0:407 [0:493] 0:303 0:433
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:467 [0:500] 0:545 0:448
- at least $25;000 0:126 [0:333] 0:152 0:119
Father works 0:824 [0:381] 0:909 0:804¤
Father’s weekly hours of work 43:74 [11:29] 44:53 43:52
Father’s annual labor income:
- less than $10;000 0:295 [0:457] 0:242 0:311+
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:463 [0:499] 0:466 0:462
- at least $25;000 0:242 [0:429] 0:292 0:227
Parents’ Assortative Mating Patterns &
Relationship Characteristics
Father is younger than mother 0:196 [0:013] 0:196 0:196
Father and mother of different race / ethnicity 0:146 [0:011] 0:158 0:142
Father is less educated than mother 0:274 [0:014] 0:292 0:270
Father’s labor income is less than mother’s 0:102 [0:023] 0:103 0:102
Parents’ known each other < 6 mons before preg. 0:121 [0:011] 0:146 0:115
Father suggested abortion during pregnancy 0:146 [0:011] 0:109 0:155+
Mother is catholic 0:253 [0:014] 0:328 0:234¤
Mother attends religious activities frequently 0:168 [0:012] 0:229 0:153¤
Other Characteristics
Mother prenatal smoking (if at all) 0:240 [0:014] 0:250 0:238
Mother prenatal drinking (if at all) 0:077 [0:009] 0:057 0:082
Mother’s PPVT score (Yr 3) 88:92 [0:358] 90:91 88:43¤
Maternal grandmother’s education (> H.S.) 0:224 [0:014] 0:220 0:225
N 958 192 766
Notes: ¤ Sample mean between “children whose parents marry after childbirth” and “children whose parents remained


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 1: Box Plot of the Estimated Propensity Score for the
Treated Units (T) and the Control Units (C)




































Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
C T C T C T C T C T C TTABLE 3
Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score
Coefﬁcient Robust Standard Error P > jzj
Child is of low birth weight (< 88 oz) ¡0:036 0:180 [0:840]
Child is female 0:022 0:103 [0:831]
Child’s birth order (mother):
- (Ref: 1st)
- 2nd 0:138 0:131 [0:294]
- 3rd or higher 0:182 0:147 [0:217]
Mother’s age < 20 ¡0:208 0:153 [0:171]
Father’s age < 20 ¡0:192 0:210 [0:361]
Father is younger than mother ¡0:058 0:140 [0:678]
Parents’ race/ethnicity:
- (Ref: both black)
- both white 0:236 0:193 [0:222]
- both Hispanic 0:602 0:198 [0:002]
- both other 0:049 0:571 [0:931]
- mother is white, father is non-white ¡0:033 0:250 [0:894]
- mother is black, father is non-black ¡0:617 0:530 [0:244]
- mother is Hispanic, father is non-Hispanic ¡0:460 0:255 [0:071]
- mother is other, father is non-other 0:199 0:659 [0:763]
Parents’ region of birth:
- (Ref: both U.S.)
- mother is foreign-born, father is not 0:264 0:374 [0:481]
- father is foreign-born, mother is not 0:108 0:178 [0:543]
- both parents are foreign-born 0:489 0:266 [0:066]
Mother’s education:
- (Ref: less than HS)
- H.S. diploma / GED ¡0:399 0:210 [0:057]
- some college ¡0:588 0:342 [0:086]
- bachelor & beyond ¡0:857 0:553 [0:121]
Father’s education:
- (Ref: less than HS)
- H.S. diploma / GED 0:291 0:203 [0:152]
- some college 0:509 0:341 [0:135]
- bachelor & beyond 1:917 0:554 [0:001]
(Continued)TABLE 3
Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score
Coefﬁcient Robust Standard Error P > jzj
Father’s education relative to mother’s:
- (Ref: same)
- less 0:463 0:236 [0:050]
- more ¡0:335 0:230 [0:145]
Child’s household income:
- (Ref: less than $10;000)
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:010 0:163 [0:950]
- at least $25;000 ¡0:020 0:170 [0:904]
Parents’ labor force participation:
- (Ref: neither parents work)
- both parents work ¡0:356 0:513 [0:488]
- only mother works ¡0:137 0:622 [0:825]
- only father works 0:062 0:216 [0:775]
Mother’s weekly hours of work 0:013 0:013 [0:311]
Father’s weekly hours of work 0:007 0:003 [0:042]
Mother’s labor income exceeds father’s ¡0:087 0:391 [0:824]
Length of parents’ relationship
before pregnancy:
- (Ref: more than 2 years)
- less than 6 months 0:354 0:163 [0:030]
- 6 months to 1 year ¡0:202 0:171 [0:238]
- 1 to 2 years 0:113 0:129 [0:378]
Mother is catholic ¡0:190 0:153 [0:212]
Mother has no religious afﬁliation ¡0:005 0:160 [0:973]
Mother attends religious activities frequently 0:472 0:136 [0:001]
Father suggested abortion during pregnancy ¡0:045 0:154 [0:770]
Maternal grandmother attained more
than a high school education 0:125 0:135 [0:354]
Prenatal smoking (mother) 0:248 0:132 [0:060]
Prenatal drinking (mother) ¡0:464 0:206 [0:024]
Parents in visiting relationship at childbirth ¡0:486 0:128 [0:000]
Mother’s PPVT score (Year 3) 0:015 0:006 [0:006]
Constant ¡3:139 0:569 [0:000]
Log Likelihood = ¡420
Pseudo R2 = 0:174
N = 958 (Treated = 192; Control = 766)
Notes: a Additional controls for “mother’s state of residence at childbirth” (14 state dummies) omitted here. b Region of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Child Psychometrics for the Behavior Outcomes
Item Description
Aggressive Behavior Cannot stand waiting, wants everything now
(a = 0:880) Deﬁant
Demands must be met immediately
Destroys things belonging to family or other children
Disobedient
Does not seem to feel guilty after misbehaving
Easily frustrated
Gets in many ﬁghts
Hits others
Hurts animals or people without meaning to
Has angry moods
Overtired
Punishment does not change behavior
Screams a lot
Selﬁsh or will not share
Stubborn, sullen, or irritable
Has temper tantrums or hot temper
Uncooperative
Wants a lot of attention
Attention Deﬁcit Disorder Cannot concentrate / pay attention for long
(a = 0:710) Cannot sit still / restless / hyperactive
Quickly shifts from one activity to another
Cannot stand waiting, wants everything now
Demands must be met immediately
Gets into everything
Oppositional Deﬁant Disorder Deﬁant
(a = 0:778) Disobedient
Has angry moods
Stubborn / sullen / irritable
Had temper tantrums or hot temper
Uncooperative
ASBI (Express Subscale) Understands others’ feelings, like when they are happy / sad / mad
(a = 0:730) Sympathetic toward other children’s distress, tries to comfort others
Open and direct about what (he/she) wants
Will join a group of children playing
Plays games and talks with other children
Conﬁdent with other people
Tends to be proud of things (he/she) does
Interested in many and different things
Enjoys talking to you
Notes: a Aggressive behavior, attention deﬁcit disorder, and oppositional deﬁant disorder are taken from the Achenbach
and Rescorla (2000) scales and diagnostics; ASBI express subscale is derived from items representing an abbreviated
version of the ASBI Express Subscale developed by Hogan et al. (1992); b Mother’s rating of the child with respect to each
item is coded: 0 = Not True, 1 = Somewhat or sometimes true, and 2 = Very true or often true; c “a” refers to Cronbach’s
alpha, which assesses the reliability of a summative rating scale composed of variables speciﬁed.TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Identiﬁcation
An identifying assumption of the matching method, namely CIA, requires that conditional on the ob-
servables, the distribution of the potential outcomes of the treated group in the absence of treatment be
identical to the outcome distribution of the controls. Since the data are uninformative about the dis-
tribution of potential outcomes for the treated group in the absence of treatment, they cannot directly
reject the CIA. Nevertheless, the literature provides some guidance in assessing this assumption.
Speciﬁcation of the Propensity Score. The propensity score matching estimator requires the potential
outcomes be mean-independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity score, p(X). An im-
portant consideration in the implementation is how to choose X, since the choice of X can make a
substantial difference in the estimator’s performance (Heckman et al., 1998; Lechner, 2001). Follow-
ing Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if the propensity score is correctly speciﬁed, there should be no
signiﬁcant differences in means of covariates that affect selection into treatment. If after conditioning
on the propensity score there is still dependence on treatment, this suggests a mis-speciﬁcation of p(X).
The balancing test can be used to check the speciﬁcation of the p(X). For a given speciﬁcation, if one
cannot ﬁnd a partition structure such that X is balanced within each block of the estimated propensity
score, it then constitutes a well-deﬁned criterion for rejecting the speciﬁcation (Dehejia and Wahba,
1999), as it indicates that the covariates included in X do not fully capture the differences between the
treatment and the control groups.
We examine how our estimated marriage effects on child PPVT score would fare in the absence of
subsets of pre-treatment covariates. In Technical Appendix Table 1, we ﬁrst estimate the propensity
score using the fewest (“basic”) controls (1), then sequentially add in household income (2), mother’s
characteristics (3), and father’s characteristics (4). (For the ease of comparison, the last row (5) re-
reports our main results using all covariates as in Table 4). The associated pseudo R2 and log likelihood
for each of the propensity score speciﬁcations are also reported.
Recall in Section V we showed that the covariate means are balanced based on our fully-speciﬁed
propensity score speciﬁcation (5). For the more parsimonious speciﬁcations (1)-(4), we are unable to
ﬁnda partitionstructuresuch thatthe includedcovariatesare balancedwithineach block. Thisindicates
that the simpler speciﬁcations do not fully capture differences between the treated and controls which
justiﬁes the rejection of these speciﬁcations. Hence, although these estimates of ATET “appear” to be
sensitive to the propensity score speciﬁcations in (1)-(4), they are invalid as the included covariates do
not fully capture differences between the treated and control groups. Following Dehejia and Wahba
(1999), the speciﬁcation search generally begins with a linear speciﬁcation, then adds higher-ordered
and interaction terms until within stratum balance is satisﬁed. Our main results (based on a linear
speciﬁcation)arerobusttotheadditionofhigher-orderedandinteractionterms(availableuponrequest).
Imbens Test. Imbens (2004) proposes an indirect way of assessing the plausibility of the CIA assump-
tion, relying on estimating a causal effect that is known to be zero. Speciﬁcally, the test involves
estimating the causal effect of the treatment on a lagged outcome, with its value determined prior to the
treatment itself. If it is not zero, this implies that the underlying conditional distribution of the potentialoutcomes of the treated under no treatment is not comparable to the control outcomes. The power of
this test is enhanced if the variable used in this proxy test is closely related to the outcome of interest.
We estimate the “causal” effects of parents’ marriage after childbirth on two pre-treatment out-
comes: (1) whether the child is of low birth weight (< 88 ozs), and (2) mother’s education at baseline.
Both of these measures were realized before the treatment can take place, and have been shown to be
highly correlated with early child cognitive performance (e.g., Tong et al., 2006; Roberts et al., 1999).
Approximately 10% of the children in our sample are of low birth weight, and 36% are born to mothers
who did not graduate from high school (or obtain an GED equivalent). As demonstrated in Technical
Appendix Table 2, all of our matching estimates show that parents’ marriage has no effect on these
pre-treatment outcomes. These tests provide additional support that the CIA assumption is satisﬁed.
Kernel Matching Estimators
Let T and C be the set of treated and untreated units, respectively. The observed outcome of a treated
unit be denoted YT
i , and YC
j denotes the observed outcome of an individual in the control group. Let
C(i) be the set of control units matched to the treated unit i with an estimated propensity score pi. The











where K(¢) is a kernel function and hn is a bandwidth parameter. We consider three matching estima-
tors, namely Uniform (also known as the “radius” matching estimator), Epanechinikov, and Gaussian
kernels, each uses a speciﬁc kernel function:
Uniform (Radius): K(u) = 1=2 for juj < 1 and 0 otherwise
Epanechinikov: K(u) = (3=4)(1¡u)2 for juj < 1, and 0 otherwise
Gaussian: K(u) = (1=
p
2p)exp[¡u2=2] for all u








is a consistent estimator of the counterfactual outcome Y0i.
Choosing the Bandwidth
Silverman’s rule-of-thumb (1986) may be used to select the optimal bandwidth:
b h = 1:06£Minfb s;R=1:34g£n¡1
5where b s = sample standard deviation, R = interquartile range (75th-quantile ¡ 25th-quantile), and n =
sample size. The method is based on the assumption that the underlying distribution of X (the propen-
sity score) is normally distributed. The rule-of-thumb will give reasonable results for all distributions
that are unimodal, fairly symmetric and do not have fat tails. However, the rule-of-thumb may not
be applicable in our case as the distribution of the estimated propensity score is far from normal (see
Technical Appendix Figure 1). As a result, the bandwidth suggested by the rule-of-thumb may be far
from optimal. If the choice of bandwidth is too large, the treated and their matches tend to differ more
on observable characteristics. As a result, the matching estimates tend to converge to that produced by
the OLS. Our matching estimates using the bandwidth suggested by the rule-of-thumb (b h ¼ 0:040) is
very close to the OLS estimates. Hence, we choose smaller bandwidth(s) (0:010 and 0:005) to ensure
closer matches between the treated and controls are used in the estimation.
Relaxing the Common Support
Our estimates are based on observations with propensity scores falling within the common support,
to ensure that there is sufﬁcient overlap between the treated and control units to enhance comparabil-
ity, which may improve the quality of our estimates. A potential drawback of imposing the common
support restriction is that high quality matches may be lost at the boundaries of the common support
and the sample may be considerably reduced. Hence imposing the common support restrictions is not
necessarily better (Lechner 2001). Imposing the common support condition results in 87 control and
6 treated units being dropped from our main analysis. To ensure that our estimates are not sensitive to
the exclusion of these observations, we also relax the common support condition and re-estimate the
ATET using all 1;051 observations.
Technical Appendix Figure 2 presents the box plot of the propensity score overlap for this sample.
Fortreatedindividualswithhighpropensityscores(Block7), therearenosuitablecontrols(nooverlap).
In this case, treated observations with high propensity scores are potentially matched with control ob-
servations that are substantially different. This is particularly problematic for matching estimators that
place positive weights on these “poor matches”, such as the Gaussian kernel. The Epanechnikov and
uniform kernels bypass this problem since zero weights are placed on these potentially poor matches,
conditional on the selected bandwidth/radius is sufﬁciently small. Overall, with the exception of the
Gaussian kernel estimate, the ATET estimates obtained by relaxing the common support condition are
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